[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 21/28] sev/i386: add debug encrypt and decry
From: |
Dr. David Alan Gilbert |
Subject: |
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 21/28] sev/i386: add debug encrypt and decrypt commands |
Date: |
Wed, 7 Mar 2018 20:11:13 +0000 |
User-agent: |
Mutt/1.9.2 (2017-12-15) |
* Brijesh Singh (address@hidden) wrote:
>
>
> On 3/7/18 12:24 PM, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> > * Brijesh Singh (address@hidden) wrote:
> >>
> >> On 03/07/2018 11:27 AM, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote:
> >>
> >> [...]
> >>
> >>>> +{
> >>>> + SEVState *s = (SEVState *)handle;
> >>>> +
> >>>> + /* If policy does not allow debug then no need to register ops */
> >>>> + if (s->policy & SEV_POLICY_NODBG) {
> >>>> + return;
> >>>> + }
> >>> So what happens if someone tries to use a gdb or monitor command when
> >>> policy didn't allow debug? Does it end up with an obvious error
> >>> somehow?
> >>>
> >> In those cases caller will get encrypted bytes, leading to unintelligible
> >> data. It can sometime translate into obvious errors e.g caller tries to
> >> walk guest pagtable and it gets garbage and will have trouble dumping the
> >> pgtables etc. Many times qemu calls ldphys_* functions to access the data
> >> it
> >> may get tricky to report the errors.
> > So would it make sense to have something like:
> >
> > sev_mem_cant_read(uint8_t *dst, const uint8_t *src, uint32_t len,
> > MemTxAttrs attrs)
> > {
> > error_report("SEV Guest policy does not allow debug access");
> >
> > return -EPERM;
> > }
>
> In very early patches we had something similar but I was not sure if
> that was right thing. Any debug accesses were printing ton of messages
OK, if it would generate silly amounts of debug then leave it as is;
but I bet it'll confuse someone in the future when they try and dig
through it for debug without realising SEV-debug is there!
Dave
> and also in some case caller actually wants to dump the memory content
> (e.g x /10gx 0x000).. what we should return in those cases ? In my
> approach was if debug was not enabled then simply don't decrypt the
> memory and provide the raw data.
>
> There was some discussion to have very high level security policy which
> may have attribute like debug=on|off, if debug is disabled then QEMU
> monitor can display messages like debug not allowed to better inform user.
>
>
> > void
> > sev_set_debug_ops(void *handle, MemoryRegion *mr)
> > {
> > SEVState *s = (SEVState *)handle;
> >
> > /* If policy does not allow debug then no need to register ops */
> > if (s->policy & SEV_POLICY_NODBG) {
> > sev_ops.read = sev_mem_cant_read;
> > sev_ops.write = sev_mem_cant_write;
> > } else {
> > sev_ops.read = sev_mem_read;
> > sev_ops.write = sev_mem_write;
> > }
> >
> > Dave
> >
> >> -Brijesh
> > --
> > Dr. David Alan Gilbert / address@hidden / Manchester, UK
>
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / address@hidden / Manchester, UK
- [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 23/28] qmp: add query-sev-launch-measure command, (continued)
- [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 23/28] qmp: add query-sev-launch-measure command, Brijesh Singh, 2018/03/07
- [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 11/28] sev/i386: add command to initialize the memory encryption context, Brijesh Singh, 2018/03/07
- [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 14/28] hmp: add 'info sev' command, Brijesh Singh, 2018/03/07
- [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 13/28] kvm: introduce memory encryption APIs, Brijesh Singh, 2018/03/07
- [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 17/28] target/i386: encrypt bios rom, Brijesh Singh, 2018/03/07
- [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 21/28] sev/i386: add debug encrypt and decrypt commands, Brijesh Singh, 2018/03/07
[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 25/28] cpu/i386: populate CPUID 0x8000_001F when SEV is active, Brijesh Singh, 2018/03/07
[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 22/28] target/i386: clear C-bit when walking SEV guest page table, Brijesh Singh, 2018/03/07
[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 26/28] qmp: add query-sev-capabilities command, Brijesh Singh, 2018/03/07
[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 27/28] sev/i386: add sev_get_capabilities(), Brijesh Singh, 2018/03/07
[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 24/28] sev/i386: add migration blocker, Brijesh Singh, 2018/03/07
[Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 28/28] tests/qmp-test: blacklist sev specific qmp commands, Brijesh Singh, 2018/03/07
Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v11 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD), no-reply, 2018/03/07