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Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 1/5] msix_init: assert programming error


From: Markus Armbruster
Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 1/5] msix_init: assert programming error
Date: Tue, 04 Oct 2016 11:33:57 +0200
User-agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.5 (gnu/linux)

"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <address@hidden> writes:

> * Markus Armbruster (address@hidden) wrote:
>> Alex Williamson <address@hidden> writes:
>> 
>> > On Thu, 29 Sep 2016 15:11:27 +0200
>> > Markus Armbruster <address@hidden> wrote:
>> >
>> >> Alex Williamson <address@hidden> writes:
>> >> 
>> >> > On Tue, 13 Sep 2016 08:16:20 +0200
>> >> > Markus Armbruster <address@hidden> wrote:
>> >> >  
>> >> >> Cc: Alex for device assignment expertise.
>> >> >> 
>> >> >> Cao jin <address@hidden> writes:
>> >> >>   
>> >> >> > On 09/12/2016 09:29 PM, Markus Armbruster wrote:    
>> >> >> >> Cao jin <address@hidden> writes:
>> >> >> >>    
>> >> >> >>> The input parameters is used for creating the msix capable device, 
>> >> >> >>> so
>> >> >> >>> they must obey the PCI spec, or else, it should be programming 
>> >> >> >>> error.    
>> >> >> >>
>> >> >> >> True when the the parameters come from a device model attempting to
>> >> >> >> define a PCI device violating the spec.  But what if the parameters 
>> >> >> >> come
>> >> >> >> from an actual PCI device violating the spec, via device 
>> >> >> >> assignment?    
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Before the patch, on invalid param, the vfio behaviour is:
>> >> >> >   error_report("vfio: msix_init failed");
>> >> >> >   then, device create fail.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > After the patch, its behaviour is:
>> >> >> >   asserted.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Do you mean we should still report some useful info to user on 
>> >> >> > invalid
>> >> >> > params?    
>> >> >> 
>> >> >> In the normal case, asking msix_init() to create MSI-X that are out of
>> >> >> spec is a programming error: the code that does it is broken and needs
>> >> >> fixing.
>> >> >> 
>> >> >> Device assignment might be the exception: there, the parameters for
>> >> >> msix_init() come from the assigned device, not the program.  If they
>> >> >> violate the spec, the device is broken.  This wouldn't be a programming
>> >> >> error.  Alex, can this happen?
>> >> >> 
>> >> >> If yes, we may want to handle it by failing device assignment.  
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> > Generally, I think the entire premise of these sorts of patches is
>> >> > flawed.  We take a working error path that allows a driver to robustly
>> >> > abort on unexpected date and turn it into a time bomb.  Often the
>> >> > excuse for this is that "error handling is hard".  Tough.  Now a
>> >> > hot-add of a device that triggers this changes from a simple failure to
>> >> > a denial of service event.  Furthermore, we base that time bomb on our
>> >> > interpretation of the spec, which we can only validate against in-tree
>> >> > devices.
>> >> >
>> >> > We have actually had assigned devices that fail the sanity test here,
>> >> > there's a quirk in vfio_msix_early_setup() for a Chelsio device with
>> >> > this bug.  Do we really want user experiencing aborts when a simple
>> >> > device initialization failure is sufficient?
>> >> >
>> >> > Generally abort code paths like this cause me to do my own sanity
>> >> > testing, which is really poor practice since we should have that sanity
>> >> > testing in the common code.  Thanks,  
>> >> 
>> >> I prefer to assert on programming error, because 1. it does double duty
>> >> as documentation, 2. error handling of impossible conditions is commonly
>> >> wrong, and 3. assertion failures have a much better chance to get the
>> >> program fixed.  Even when presence of a working error path kills 2., the
>> >> other two make me stick to assertions.
>> >
>> > So we're looking at:
>> >
>> >> -    if (nentries < 1 || nentries > PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_QSIZE + 1) {
>> >> -        return -EINVAL;
>> >> -    }
>> >
>> > vs
>> >
>> >> +    assert(nentries >= 1 && nentries <= PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_QSIZE + 1);
>> >
>> > How do you argue that one of these provides better self documentation
>> > than the other?
>> 
>> The first one says "this can happen, and when it does, the function
>> fails cleanly."  For a genuine programming error, this is in part
>> misleading.
>> 
>> The second one says "I assert this can't happen.  We'd be toast if I was
>> wrong."
>> 
>> > The assert may have a better chance of getting fixed, but it's because
>> > the existence of the assert itself exposes a vulnerability in the code.
>> > Which would you rather have in production, a VMM that crashes on the
>> > slightest deviance from the input it expects or one that simply errors
>> > the faulting code path and continues?
>> 
>> Invalid input to a program should never be treated as programming error.
>> 
>> > Error handling is hard, which is why we need to look at it as a
>> > collection of smaller problems.  We return an error at a leaf function
>> > and let callers of that function decide how to handle it.  If some of
>> > those callers don't want to deal with error handling, abort there, we
>> > can come back to them later, but let the code paths that do want proper
>> > error handling to continue.  If we add aborts into the leaf function,
>> > then any calling path that wants to be robust against an error needs to
>> > fully sanitize the input itself, at which point we have different
>> > drivers sanitizing in different ways, all building up walls to protect
>> > themselves from the time bombs in these leaf functions.  It's crazy.
>> 
>> It depends on the kind of error in the leaf function.
>> 
>> I suspect we're talking past each other because we got different kinds
>> of errors in mind.
>> 
>> Programming is impossible without things like preconditions,
>> postconditions, invariants.
>> 
>> If a section of code is entered when its precondition doesn't hold,
>> we're toast.  This is the archetypical programming error.
>> 
>> If it can actually happen, the program is incorrect, and needs fixing.
>> 
>> Checking preconditions is often (but not always) practical.  In my
>> opinion, checking is good practice, and the proper way to check is
>> assert().  Makes the incorrect program fail before it can do further
>> damage, and helps with finding the programming error.
>> 
>> A preconditions is part of the contract between a function and its
>> users.  An strong precondition can make the function's job easier, but
>> that's no use if the resulting function is inconvenient to use.  On the
>> other hand, complicating the function to get a weaker precondition
>> nobody actually needs is just as dumb.
>> 
>> Returning an error is *not* checking preconditions.  Remember, if the
>> precondition doesn't hold, we're toast.  If we're toast when we return
>> an error, we're clearly doing it wrong.
>> 
>> You are arguing for weaker preconditions.  I'm not actually disagreeing
>> with you!  I'm merely expressing my opinion that checking preconditions
>> with assert() is a good idea.
>
> I have a fairly strong dislike for asserts in qemu, and although I'm not
> always consistent, my reasoning is mainly to do with asserts once a guest
> is running.
>
> Lets imagine you have a happily running guest and then you try and do
> something new and complex (e.g. hotplug a vfio-device); now lets say that
> new thing has something very broken about it, do you really want the 
> previously
> running guest to die?

If a precondition doesn't hold, we're toast.  The best we can do is
crash before we mess up things further.

A problematic condition we can safely recover from can be made an error
condition.

I think the crux of our misunderstandings (I hesitate to call it an
argument) is confusing recoverable error conditions with violated
preconditions.  We all agree (violently, perhaps) that assert() is not
an acceptable error handling mechanism.

> My view is it can very much depend on how broken you think the
> world is; you've got to remember that crashing at this point
> is going to lose the user a VM, and that could mean losing
> data - so at that point you have to make a decision about whether
> your lack of confidence in the state of the VM due to the failed
> precondition is worse than your knowledge that the VM is going to fail.
>
> Perhaps giving the user an error and disabling the device lets
> the admin gravefully shutdown the VM and walk away with all
> their data intact.

This is risky business unless you can prove the problematic condition is
safely isolated.  To elaborate on your device example: say some logic
error in device emulation code put the device instance in some broken
state.  If you detect that before the device could mess up anything
else, fencing the device is safe.  But if device state is borked because
some other code overran an array, continuing risks making things worse.
Crashing the guest is bad.  Letting it first overwrite good data with
bad data is worse.

Sadly, such proof is hardly ever possible in unrestricted C.  So we're
down to probabilities and tradeoffs.

I'd reject a claim that once the guest is running the tradeoffs *always*
favour trying to hobble on.

If you want a less bleak isolation and recovery story, check out Erlang.
Note that its "let it crash" philosophy is very much in accordance with
my views on what can safely be done after detecting a programming error
/ violated precondition.

> So I wouldn't argue for weaker preconditions, just what the
> result is if the precondition fails.

I respectfully disagree with your use of the concept "precondition".



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