Re: [Qemu-block] [PATCH for 2.10] block: use 1 MB bounce buffers for crypto instead of 16KB

[Daniel P. Berrange]

On Fri, Aug 04, 2017 at 07:08:54AM -0500, Eric Blake wrote:
> On 08/04/2017 05:51 AM, Daniel P. Berrange wrote:
> > Using 16KB bounce buffers creates a significant performance
> > penalty for I/O to encrypted volumes on storage with high
> > I/O latency (rotating rust & network drives), because it
> > triggers lots of fairly small I/O operations.
> > 
> > On tests with rotating rust, and cache=none|directsync,
> > write speed increased from 2MiB/s to 32MiB/s, on a par
> > with that achieved by the in-kernel luks driver.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrange <address@hidden>
> > ---
> >  block/crypto.c | 12 +++++-------
> >  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/block/crypto.c b/block/crypto.c
> > index 58ef6f2f52..207941db9a 100644
> > --- a/block/crypto.c
> > +++ b/block/crypto.c
> > @@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ static void block_crypto_close(BlockDriverState *bs)
> >  }
> >  
> >  
> > -#define BLOCK_CRYPTO_MAX_SECTORS 32
> > +#define BLOCK_CRYPTO_MAX_SECTORS 2048
> >  
> >  static coroutine_fn int
> >  block_crypto_co_readv(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t sector_num,
> > @@ -396,9 +396,8 @@ block_crypto_co_readv(BlockDriverState *bs, int64_t 
> > sector_num,
> >  
> >      qemu_iovec_init(&hd_qiov, qiov->niov);
> >  
> > -    /* Bounce buffer so we have a linear mem region for
> > -     * entire sector. XXX optimize so we avoid bounce
> > -     * buffer in case that qiov->niov == 1
> > +    /* Bounce buffer because we're not permitted to touch
> > +     * contents of qiov - it points to guest memory.
> 
> The comment updates are accurate (and in line with your other patch for
> improving documentation of the callback semantics), but slightly
> unrelated to the fix at hand. However, I have no problem keeping it in
> the patch.
> 
> (To make sure I understand the importance of the bounce buffer: On
> reads, we can't store into the buffer until we have decrypted, so that
> the guest can't transiently spy on the encrypted form; on writes, we
> must read from the buffer at most once before encrypting, so that the
> guest can't change the buffer under our feet while we are encrypting.)

For writes it is even more critical - if we encrypted in place, and the
guest tried to serve a later read from its cache, it'd return cipher
text instead of plain text.

Regards,
Daniel
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