[GNUnet-SVN] [taler-exchange] 02/03: Introduction does not know where it's going towards the end, but

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commit 93edc84e601d2f813572b8f849fa2ccaa2a96fa5
Author: Jeffrey Burdges <address@hidden>
AuthorDate: Sun May 7 14:04:15 2017 +0200

    Introduction does not know where it's going towards the end, but
    
    maybe that's okay since we do not know wher it is going yet either.
---
 doc/paper/postquantum.tex | 19 +++++--------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)

diff --git a/doc/paper/postquantum.tex b/doc/paper/postquantum.tex
index debb560..9a4f2e9 100644
--- a/doc/paper/postquantum.tex
+++ b/doc/paper/postquantum.tex
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ First, we describe attaching contemporary post-quantum key 
exchanges,
 based on either super-singular eliptic curve isogenies \cite{SIDH} or
 ring learning with errors (Ring-LWE) \cite{Peikert14,NewHope}.
 These provide strong post-quantum security so long as the underlying
-scheme remains secure; however, these schemes youth leaves them
+scheme remains secure; however, these schemes' youth leaves them
 relatively untested.
 
 Second, we propose a hash based scheme whose anonymity garentee needs
@@ -144,24 +144,15 @@ the vible security paramater is numerically far smaller 
than in the
 key exchange systems, but covers query complexity which we believe
 suffices.
 
-We describe this hash based proof-of-encryption-to-self scheme in
-parallel with the 
-As is the practice with hash based signature schemes 
-
-
-
-
-In this paper, we describe a post-quantum 
-
-It replaces an elliptic curve Diffe-Hellman operation with a unique
-hash-based encryption scheme for the proof-of-trust via key knoledge
-property that Taler requires to distinguish untaxable operations from
-taxable purchases. 
+We describe this hash based proof-of-encryption-to-self scheme to
+align the discription of all our schemes.
 
 ...
 
 \smallskip
 
+%TODO : What is this part for?
+
 We observe that several elliptic curve blind signature schemes provide
 information theoreticly secure blinding as well, but 
  Schnorr sgnatures require an extra round trip \cite{??}, and

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