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Re: [Nix-dev] Authenticating binary substitutes
From: |
Ludovic Courtès |
Subject: |
Re: [Nix-dev] Authenticating binary substitutes |
Date: |
Wed, 22 May 2013 18:05:18 +0200 |
User-agent: |
Gnus/5.130007 (Ma Gnus v0.7) Emacs/24.3 (gnu/linux) |
Lluís Batlle i Rossell <address@hidden> skribis:
> On Wed, May 22, 2013 at 05:12:20PM +0200, Ludovic Courtès wrote:
>> Hello,
>>
>> Currently the “binary cache” substituter relies on DNS to authenticate
>> downloaded binaries: anything coming from, say, hydra.nixos.org is
>> considered authentic, because hydra.nixos.org is listed in the
>> ‘trusted-binary-cache’ list.
>>
>> This is obviously subject to person-in-the-middle attacks: one could
>> connect over Wifi to somebody else’s network, which happens to redirect
>> hydra.nixos.org to evil.example.com, and end up downloading evil binaries.
>>
>> I was thinking of a simple extension to solve that:
>>
>> 1a. The /nix-cache-info file would contain an (optional)
>> ‘OpenPGPFingerprint’ field, to announce the fingerprint of the
>> OpenPGP key used to sign Nars.
>>
>> 1b. In addition to, or alternatively, a /nix-signing-key file would be
>> served, containing the OpenPGP key used to sign Nars.
>>
>> 2. In addition to serving, say,
>> /nar/zwpx7d0sv36fi4xpwqx2dak0axx5nji8-gmp-5.1.1, the server would
>> also serve /nar/zwpx7d0sv36fi4xpwqx2dak0axx5nji8-gmp-5.1.1.sig, an
>> OpenPGP binary signature of the uncompressed Nar.
>>
>> WDYT? Could this be implemented in Hydra?
>
> I add myself to the request.
Thanks. ;-)
> The /nix-cache-info or /nix-signing-key files should be requested
> only once and stored in the local system, unless the user deletes them. If
> they
> are fetched at every run, we are doomed again.
Sure. They’re only needed when you get introduced to a server anyway.
Ludo’.